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Logics of knowledge and action: critical
analysis and challenges
Andreas Herzig
Abstract We overview the most prominent logics of knowledge and action that were pro-
posed and studied in the multiagent systems literature. We classify them according to these
two dimensions, knowledge and action, and moreover introduce a distinction between indi-
vidual knowledge and group knowledge, and between a nonstrategic an a strategic interpreta-
tion of action operators. For each of the logics in our classification we highlight problematic
properties. They indicate weaknesses in the design of these logics and call into question
their suitability to represent knowledge and reason about it. This leads to a list of research
challenges.
Keywords Logic of action · Logic of knowledge · Common knowledge · Frame problem ·
Uniform strategy
1 Introduction
A central issue in the study of multiagent systems (MAS) is the formal analysis of its relevant
concepts as well as their interplay. Agents are typically analysed in terms of the concepts
of knowledge, belief, desire, goal, and intention; their interaction is typically analysed in
terms of the concepts of action, event, and time. Following a well-established tradition in
philosophical logic and in the artificial intelligence subfield of knowledge representation,
many researchers have directed their attention to formal logics in order to account for these
concepts and design appropriate logical languages enabling formal reasoning.
In this paper we focus on the logics of two concepts playing a fundamental role in MAS:
knowledge and action. They are of utmost importance in any area of research whose aim
is to model intelligent agents, be they human or artificial. Typical situations to be modelled
are when agents with imperfect knowledge perform actions in order to achieve goals. Often
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the resulting models involve not only individual knowledge and individual actions, but also
group knowledge and joint actions. For example, the joint actions of speakers and hearers in
a dialogue build the common ground, which has been analysed in the literature as a kind of
group knowledge.
The main logics of knowledge and action that were proposed in the philosophical and
computer science literature are modal logics: extensions of classical propositional logic by
modal operators. The latter enable us to talk in a natural way about what an agent knows and
what the effects of his actions are. For example, the modal operator of knowledge is written
Ki , where i is an agent name and where the formula Kiϕ reads “i knows that ϕ”; and the
modal operator of ability is written 〈i〉, where the formula 〈i〉ϕ reads “i can achieve ϕ”. These
two kinds of operators combine in a natural way: for example, the formula 〈i〉K jϕ expresses
that i can achieve that j knows that ϕ, and the formulaKi¬〈 j〉ϕ expresses that i knows that j
cannot achieve ϕ. Furthermore, we distinguish two different readings of action operators. In
a nonstrategic reading we say that i can achieve ϕ if the other agents do not act; in a strategic
reading we say that i can achieve ϕ whatever the other agents do. We reserve the traditional
‘diamond’ modal operator 〈i〉 for the former reading and use 〈[i]〉 for the latter, combining a
modal diamond and a modal box in a way that renders its ‘exists/for all’ quantification. The
notation generalises from individual agents to groups.
The first contribution of the present paper is a classification of the main logics of action
and knowledge along the knowledge dimension and the action dimension. In the knowledge
dimension we distinguish logics that do not account for knowledge at all, logics that only
account for individual knowledge, and logics that account for group knowledge; and in the
action dimension we distinguish logics that do not account for actions at all, logics that only
have nonstrategic action operators, and logics that have strategic action operators. This makes
up a 3×3 grid. Its simplest element is classical propositional logic: the logic which neither
accounts for knowledge nor for action. The other eight categories are extensions of classical
propositional logic by particular families of modal operators.
Our second and main contribution is a critical assessment of the most prominent existing
logics in each of the eight relevant categories. For all but classical propositional logic we
highlight one or more problematic properties. They can be traced back either to the design
of the logical language—some natural statements cannot be expressed—or to the design
of the logic itself—either too many or too little theorems. The former property affects the
suitability of these logics for knowledge representationwhile the latter affects their suitability
for drawing appropriate conclusions from the knowledge once it has been represented. Some
of these problems had already been identified in particular in the philosophical literature.
However, they were often ignored in the MAS and artificial intelligence literature.
We present each logic syntactically: we entirely omit the semantical aspects of the logics
(which are quite involved in some cases) and instead list and discuss for each logic under
examination its logical principles, i.e., its axioms and inference rules. This suffices to explain
the problems thatwewant to point out, while providing at the same time a concise and uniform
presentation. It also squares well with our knowledge representation perspective. This said,
we are aware that much of the work on logics for MAS is heavily semantic-driven, foremost
in the temporal logic literature where there was a ‘theorem proving vs. model checking’
debate [49] and where model checking is the most important reasoning technique. The model
checking perspective was also adopted by several authors in the epistemic logic literature
[75,89]. In the ‘theorem proving vs. model checking’ debate the main argument for the latter
was better chances for decidability and a generally lower complexity.Wewould however like
to separate such more mathematical concerns from our present more philosophical concerns:
the conceptual analysis should precede the investigation of computational properties, and we
believe that the conceptual weaknesses that we are going to highlight are important enough
to justify our enterprise.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we introduce two kinds of modal
operators of knowledge and two kinds of modal operators of action, leading to a grid of
nine classes of MAS logics. In the remaining sections we basically examine one exem-
plary logic per class, omitting the class having neither action nor knowledge operators. For
two of the classes we present two logics. We start by examining logics without knowl-
edge operators: Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) and Coalition Logic of Propositional
Control (CL-PC) as logics with nonstrategic action operators (Sect. 3) and Alternating-time
Temporal Logic (ATL) and Seeing-To-It-That Logic (STIT) as logics with strategic action
operators (Sect. 4).The following three sections examine logics with operators of individual
knowledge: the basic epistemic logic S5 (Sect. 5), Public Announcement Logic (PAL) as a
logic with nonstrategic action operators (Sect. 6), and Alternating-time Epistemic Temporal
Logic (ATEL) as a logic with strategic action operators (Sect. 7). The last three sections
are about extensions of some underlying logic with the common knowledge operator: S5CK
extends S5 (Sect. 8), PALCK extends PAL (Sect. 9), and ATELCK extends ATEL (Sect. 10).
Based on the critiques of the preceding sections, Sect. 11 concludes by a list of research
challenges.
2 A classification of MAS logics
We start by introducing a modal language that extends the language of classical propositional
logic by modal operators of knowledge and modal operators of action. We distinguish two
kinds of modal operators of knowledge and two kinds of modal operators of action.
Beyond the logical operators our language has the following non-logical symbols: propo-
sitional variables, action names, and agent names. More precisely, we suppose given
– a countable set of propositional variables P = {p, q, q1, . . .};
– a countable set of action names A = {a, b, b1, . . .};
– a finite set of agent names I = {i, j, j1, . . .}.
Nonempty subsets of I are called groups or coalitions.1 For a given coalition J , the elements
of its complement J = I \ J are called the opponents of J . Throughout the paper we use
the term ‘group’ in general, while we use ‘coalition’ only when we reason strategically, i.e.,
when we take into account what the coalition’s opponents might do (cf. the readings of the
ability operators in Sect. 2.2).
All the logics in this paper will be presented syntactically, in terms of axiomatisations
made up of axiom schemas and inference rules. All of them have a classical basis that we do
not list explicitly: some axiom schemas for classical propositional logic plus the inference
rule ofmodus ponens. A deduction of a formulaϕ from a set of formulasΓ is a finite sequence
of formulas whose last element is ϕ and which is such that each element of the sequence is
either an element of Γ , or an instance of an axiom schema, or is obtained from preceding
elements in the sequence by an inference rule. This is called deductionwith global hypotheses
in modal logic. One may also define deduction with local hypotheses; the definition is a bit
more complicated. When ϕ is deducible from Γ with the axiomatisation L then we write
1 The set of agent names cannot be infinite if we want the set of all groups of agents to be enumerable—for
example, if Iwere allowed to be the set of natural numbers then the set of subsets of Iwould be uncountable—,
and enumerability is necessary to obtain finite axiomatisations. Another way out is to only consider finite
subsets of an infinite set of agents.We refer to [48] for non-finite axiomatisations of logics of group knowledge.
Γ ⊢L ϕ. When Γ = {χ} is a singleton we write χ ⊢L ϕ, and when γ is empty we write
⊢L ϕ instead of ∅ ⊢L ϕ. In the latter case the deduction is called a proof, and provable
formulas are called theorems.
2.1 Modal operators of knowledge
The modal operators of knowledge are parametrised by either an individual agent or a set of
agents. In the former case of individual knowledge, modal formulas take the form Kiϕ where
ϕ is a formula and are read “agent i knows that ϕ”. In the latter case we distinguish several
kinds of group knowledge: shared, common and distributed.
A formula ϕ is shared knowledge in the group of agents J , written EKJϕ, if each agent
in J knows that ϕ. EKJϕ is therefore identical to the conjunction of individual knowledge:
EKJϕ ↔
∧
i∈J
Kiϕ.
In most presentations EKJϕ is actually defined as an abbreviation of
∧
i∈J Kiϕ. The concept
can therefore be added without any technical difficulties to a logic of individual knowledge,
and we do not present it in more detail here.
A formula ϕ is common knowledge in J , written CKJϕ, if it is shared knowledge that ϕ,
it is shared knowledge that it is shared knowledge that ϕ, and so on. Intuitively, CKJϕ is
therefore equivalent to an infinite conjunction:
CKJϕ ↔ EKJϕ ∧ EKJEKJϕ ∧ EKJEKJEKJϕ ∧ · · · .
Such an infinite conjunction is however not a well-formed formula: differently from the
shared knowledge operator, the common knowledge operator cannot be defined from the
modal operators of individual knowledge by means of an abbreviation. The way out is to add
the modal operators CKJ to the language and to give them the status of full-fledged logical
connectives.
A formulaϕ isdistributed knowledge in group J ifϕ follows from the combinedknowledge
of the agents in J . It is somewhat difficult to grasp the concept syntactically beyond that
informal definition. We here do so only in an approximate manner and view distributed
knowledge as ‘hypothetical common knowledge’: ϕ is distributed knowledge in the group of
agents J , writtenDKJϕ, if it is the case that when each agent communicates all his individual
knowledge to all the other agents in J then ϕ becomes common knowledge in J .We do not go
into the details for two reasons: first, the standard way of presentating distributed knowledge
is semantical (in terms of the intersection of the accessibility relations of the group members)
and cannot be characterised axiomatically (because intersection of accessibility relations is
not modally definable); second, its semantics has some known conceptual problems: there
are Kripke models where formally there is distributed knowledge that ϕ, while intuitively
this is not the case [83,94]. Moreover, distributed knowledge was not studied to the same
extent as common knowledge.We are going to discuss it briefly in two places: in Sect. 9.3 we
explain the shortcomings of our definition of distributed knowledge as hypothetical common
knowledge when examining the extension of Public Announcement Logic (PAL) with group
knowledge, and in Sect. 10 we discuss the role of distributed knowledge when investigating
uniform strategies in logics with group knowledge.
Common knowledge implies shared knowledge, shared knowledge implies individual
knowledge, individual knowledge implies distributed knowledge, and distributed knowledge
implies truth; in formulas, we have CKJϕ → EKJϕ, EKJϕ → Kiϕ if i ∈ J , Kiϕ → DKJϕ
Table 1 The modal operators of
knowledge
Type of operator Notation Reading
Individual Kiϕ “Agent i knows that ϕ”
Group EKJϕ “It is shared knowledge in J that ϕ”,
“Every agent in J knows that ϕ”
CKJϕ “It is common knowledge in J that ϕ”
DKJϕ “It is distributed knowledge in J that ϕ”
if i ∈ J , and DKJϕ → ϕ. In the case of singleton groups, all three concepts of group
knowledge coincide with individual knowledge: the formulas CK{i}ϕ, EK{i}ϕ, Kiϕ, and
DK{i}ϕ are all equivalent.
The different modal operators of knowledge and their readings are listed in Table 1.
2.2 Modal operators of action and ability
The modal operators of action relate an agent or group of agents to a formula that is viewed
as the outcome of the agent’s action.
Most of the MAS logics deal with potential action, as opposed to actual action: they talk
about the ability of an agent or a group of agents to achieve some outcome, and not about
what they actually do. We are therefore mainly going to deal withmodal operators of ability.
Modal operators of ability can be interpreted in twoways. In the nonstrategic interpretation
it is supposed that no other action is performed: the outcome is achieved ceteris paribus. In
the strategic interpretation the outcome is achieved whatever the other agents do. (There
seems to be no scholarly name for that opposite of ceteris paribus; ceteris mutandis, ceteris
variantis, or ceteris agentis might be suitable.) The strategic interpretation is appropriate to
reason about strategic games, where one studies whether an agent or a coalition of agents
has a winning strategy.
– In the nonstrategic interpretation, modal formulas take the form 〈J 〉ϕ and are read “group
J can achieve ϕ while the other agents don’t act”.
– In the strategic interpretation,modal formulas take the form 〈[J ]〉ψ and are read “coalition
J can achieve ψ whatever the opponents do”.2
In nonstrategic contexts we talk about groups, while in strategic contexts we talk about
coalitions and their opponents.
Only the so-called modal logics of agency deal with actual action. We here limit ourselves
to one such operator: the operator of seeing-to-it-that, abbreviated ‘stit’ [19,64]. Agency
formulas take the form StitJϕ and are read “J achieves ϕ whatever the opponents do”. There
exists another tradition studying a similar modal operator of agency that is read “i brings it
about that” [34,60,90]. We do not discuss it here because the logics of these operators lack
the modal operator of historical possibility: the latter will be instrumental for us in Sect. 7,
where we relate stit logics to other strategic logics in order to solve the problems occurring
there.
All the modal operators of action that we have introduced up to now relate agents and
outcomes, but leave implicit the action the agent performs to achieve the outcome. There exist
2 We have chosen the notation 〈[J ]〉—the nesting of a modal diamond and a modal box—in order to signal
a ∀∃ quantification. It is however not standard in the literature, where one can find 〈J 〉 in Pauly’s Coalition
Logic CL and 〈〈J 〉〉 in Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL).
Table 2 The modal operators of ability and action
Type of operator Notation Reading
Nonstrategic 〈pi〉ϕ “Action pi can achieve ϕ if the other agents do nothing”,
“There is an execution of program pi after which ϕ”
〈J 〉ϕ “Group J can achieve ϕ while the other agents don’t act”
Strategic 〈[J ]〉ψ “Coalition J can achieve ψ whatever the opponents do”
StitJϕ “Coalition J achieves ϕ whatever the opponents do”
Table 3 The grid of MAS logics
Knowledge
Action No actions Nonstrategic action Strategic action
No uncertainty CL-PC; PDL ATL; STIT
Individual knowledge S5 PAL ATEL
Group knowledge S5CK PALCK ATELCK
logics with names for actions in the language. Beyond such atomic actions they also allow
to talk about complex actions, that may also be called plans. Complex actions are built from
atomic actions by means of program operators such as sequential composition and iteration.
Modal formulas take the form 〈pi〉ϕ and are read “there is an execution of plan pi after which
ϕ”. In principle such so-called dynamic operators can be interpreted both in a nonstrategic
and in a strategic way. The only standard logic in the literature with such dynamic operators,
PDL, comeswith the first interpretation. However and aswewill discuss in Sect. 4, logicswith
strategic operators 〈[J ]〉 that are indexed by actions committing some agents to perform some
actions were proposed recently in the literature.When the committed agents are exactly those
of J then we obtain a dynamic operator with a strategic interpretation. While the standard
syntax of PDL does not provide agent names, we suppose that each action name a ∈ A
comes with an agent name i ∈ I identifying the author of a. This is written ai or i :a. The
logical language is extended in this way in many papers in theMAS literature, for example in
[55,65,84].
The different modal operators of ability and action are summarised in Table 2.
2.3 The grid of MAS logics
Our classification of logics according to the knowledge and the action dimension leads to
the nine classes of logics that are depicted in the 3×3 grid in Table 3. We do not mention
there any logic lacking both knowledge operators and action operators: this would be good
old classical propositional logic, which it is not interesting for our enterprise.
For each of the remaining eight classeswe give one prominent logic. Aswe havemotivated
above, we discuss further representatives for the two classes of logics without knowledge
operators: in the nonstrategic category we discuss PDL and in the strategic category we
discuss STIT.
In the rest of the paper we are going to critically examine each of the ten logics in our
grid.
3 No uncertainty, nonstrategic actions: PDL and CL-PC
We start by recalling PDL, which is a logic with names for actions, and show that it suffers
from the frame problem. We then present a dialect of PDL solving the frame problem,
Dynamic Logic of Propositional Assignments (DL-PA). We finally recall CL-PC, which is a
logic without explicit actions, and present its embedding into DL-PA.
3.1 Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL)
The authors of PDL [51,52] were motivated by the verification of computer programs. Later,
PDL was also applied in philosophy of action [100]. Its language has modal formulas of the
form 〈pi〉ϕ, where ϕ is a formula andpi is a complex action—alias a plan or a program—, read
“there exists a possible execution of pi after which ϕ” or “action pi possibly achieves ϕ (if the
opponents do nothing)”. The latter reading indicates that in PDL, the interpretation of actions
is nonstrategic. The modal operator 〈pi〉 comprehends an existential quantification; a dual
operator [pi]with a universal quantification is defined by the abbreviation [pi]ϕ
def
= ¬〈pi〉¬ϕ.
It therefore has to be read “ϕ after every possible execution of pi” or “pi necessarily achieves
ϕ (if the opponents do nothing)”. The program pi is either an atomic program a, a sequential
composition pi;pi , a nondeterministic composition pi ∪ pi , a finite iteration pi∗, or a test ϕ?,
where ϕ is a formula. The standard programming instructions can then be defined as PDL
programs: for example, the program⊤? is the ‘skip’ action, (ϕ?;pi1)∪ (¬ϕ?;pi2) is nothing
but the conditional “if ϕ then pi1 else pi2” and (ϕ?;pi)∗; ¬ϕ? is the loop “while ϕ do pi”.
The star-free fragment of PDL is the set of formulas without the iteration operator ∗, that
is also called ‘Kleene star’.
As we have already said in Sect. 2.2, while the original language of PDL is not designed
for multiple agents, one may nevertheless accommodate them by indexing atomic actions
with agent names: we suppose that the members of the set of action names A have the form
i :b where i is an agent and b is an action name. For example, the formula 〈i1:b1〉⊤∧[i2:b1]⊥
expresses that i1 is able to perform b1 and i2 is not.
The axiomatisation of PDL is given in Table 4. The principles in the left column, RE(〈pi〉),
N(〈pi〉), M(〈pi〉), C(〈pi〉), and Dual(〈pi〉), are common to all so-called normal modal logics
[20,29]; M(〈pi〉) and C(〈pi〉) can be replaced by the axiom K(〈pi〉): ([pi]ϕ ∧ [pi](ϕ→ψ)) →
[pi]ψ . The right column of Table 4 is about the PDL program operators. Its schemas Seq,
Nondet, and Test are equivalences without program operators on the right. It follows that
for the star-free fragment, all program operators can be eliminated. For the iteration operator ∗
there are two axioms: FP(〈pi∗〉) is a fixpoint axiom and LFP(〈pi∗〉) is a least fixpoint axiom.
When ϕ is deducible from Γ in PDL we write Γ ⊢PDL ϕ. The following version of the
deduction theorem holds:
χ ⊢PDL ϕ iff ⊢PDL
[
(i1:b1 ∪ · · · ∪ in :bn)
∗
]
χ → ϕ,
where {i1:b1, . . . , in :bn} is the set of atomic actions occurring in ϕ.
The problem of deciding the satisfiability of a PDL formula is PSPACE complete for the
star-free fragment and EXPTIME complete for the full language [91].
3.2 Reasoning about ability and the frame problem
In PDL, one can describe an atomic action i :b by means of formulas stating its pre-
conditions and (possibly conditional) effects. These formulas respectively take the form
Precond → 〈i :b〉⊤ and Cond → [i :b]Effect. A set of such formulas makes up a theory
Table 4 Axiomatisation of PDL
RE(〈pi〉)
ϕ ↔ ϕ′
〈pi〉ϕ ↔ 〈pi〉ϕ′
Seq 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ ↔ 〈pi1〉〈pi2〉ϕ
N(〈pi〉) ¬〈pi〉⊥ Nondet 〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉ϕ ↔ 〈pi1〉ϕ ∨ 〈pi2〉ϕ
M(〈pi〉) 〈pi〉(ϕ ∨ ψ) →
(
〈pi〉ϕ ∨ 〈pi〉ψ
)
Test 〈ϕ?〉ψ ↔ ϕ ∧ ψ
C(〈pi〉)
(
〈pi〉ϕ ∨ 〈pi〉ψ
)
→ 〈pi〉(ϕ ∨ ψ) FP(〈pi∗〉) 〈pi∗〉ϕ ↔ ϕ ∨ 〈pi〉〈pi∗〉ϕ
Dual(〈pi〉) [pi ]ϕ ↔ ¬〈pi〉¬ϕ LFP(〈pi∗〉) 〈pi∗〉ϕ →
(
ϕ ∨ 〈pi∗〉(¬ϕ ∧ 〈pi〉ϕ)
)
of actions ActionTheory. Given ActionTheory, one typically wants to check whether given
the description of the initial state Init, the group of agents {i1, . . . , in} is possibly able to
achieve the goal Goal by means of a sequence of atomic actions i1:b1; · · · ; in :bn . This is
the most basic multiagent version of a prediction task. More elaborate versions with syn-
chronous or asynchronous execution of actions can be designed [35]. Formally, the above
prediction task amounts to checking whether Init → 〈i1:b1; · · · ; in :bn〉Goal can be deduced
from ActionTheory, i.e., to checking whether
ActionTheory ⊢PDL Init → 〈i1:b1; · · · ; in :bn〉Goal.
The above formula only guarantees that the group is possibly able to achieve ϕ. If actions
are nondeterministic then we often rather want to know whether the group is necessarily able
to achieve ϕ. We then have to check the deducibility of the following formula:
ActionTheory ⊢ Init →
(
〈i1:b1; · · · ; in :bn〉⊤ ∧ [i1:b1; · · · ; in :bn]Goal
)
.
Let us suppose we want to formulate an action theory for a domain containing the action
i :moveBlockL1,L2 of agent i moving some block from location L1 to L2. Suppose the set of
propositional variables P contains BlockRed. Then the action theory has to contain the two
implications
BlockRed → [i :moveBlockL1,L2 ]BlockRed,
¬BlockRed → [i :moveBlockL1,L2 ]¬BlockRed
in order to guarantee that the colour of the block is not altered by moving it. Formulas
of that form are called frame axioms. Intuitively, action theories should not contain such
formulas; instead, they should rather be deducible from it. This however fails to be the
case here: the logic PDL is too weak and suffers from the so-called frame problem [82].
Formally and according to Reiter [93], an appropriate reasoning about actions formalisms
should have action descriptions with size much smaller than Card(P)×Card(I) (assuming
that P is finite). His argument appeals to the principle of inertia, which basically says that an
action only modifies the truth value of very few propositional variables and leaves the others
unchanged.
In contrast, the addition of frame axioms to a PDL action theory results in a set of formulas
whose size is in the order of Card(P)× Card(I).
3.3 Reiter’s solution to the frame problem
The frame problem not only plagues PDL, but virtually every logic-based framework for
reasoning about a dynamic system. Interestingly, it was also investigated during the last
decade in theoretical computer science, where separation logic is considered to be a solution
that enables local reasoning about memory structures such as heaps or chained lists [87]. In
the artificial intelligence field of reasoning about actions, a lot of dedicated logical formalisms
were developed in the eighties in order to solve the frame problem, including the Situation
Calculus [82], the Event Calculus [101], the Fluent Calculus [103], and so-called action
languages such as A, B, C, C+, and most recently BC [41,71].
One of the most popular solutions to the frame problem is Reiter’s [92,93] in terms of
what he calls successor state axioms. While Reiter’s original framework was the Situation
Calculus, his solution can be imported into PDL if we augment it by variables for action
names, quantifiers and the equality predicate. We call the resulting logic PDL∀. We know of
no result in the literature about the precise relationship with first-order dynamic logic [51,52]
where variables do not range over atomic programs but over objects of the world (just as in
first-order logic) and just note that the two logics are a priori different.
The successor state axiom for the propositional variable BlockRed can be formulated in
PDL∀ as
∀x
(
[x]BlockRed ↔
(
x=(i :paintRed) ∨ (BlockRed ∧ x =(i :paintBlue))
))
,
where in order to simplify we suppose that i is the only agent who is able to paint and that
the only available colours are red and blue. The general form of a successor state axiom for
a propositional variable p is
∀x
(
[x]p ↔ γp(x)
)
,
where x is a variable ranging over the set of actions and γp(x) is a boolean formula. It
determines the truth value of p after action x given the truth value of γp(x) before x . This
presupposes complete knowledge about the pre- and postconditions of each action a. In other
words, Reiter’s solution does not work when there are integrity constraints, such as that a
block cannot be both red and blue and that a blockmust have a colour. Taking such constraints
into account would pose the ramification problem.
Reiter’s basic action theories have one successor state axiom per propositional variable
in P. This solves the frame problem: the cardinality of a basic action theory is linear in that
of P, and if we suppose with Reiter that the length of each successor state axiom is bounded
then we obtain an action theory whose size is also linear in that of P.
While the basic version of Reiter’s solution is for deterministic actions only, nondeter-
minism can be modelled by means of PDL’s operator of nondeterministic composition.
To sum it up, the adoption of Reiter’s solution seems to require quantification over
action names, which is not available in PDL. However, as we will show in the sequel,
Reiter’s solution can be captured in a simple variant of PDL that stays in the propositional
realm.
3.4 DL-PA: a variant of PDL solving the frame problem
It was shown in [114] that Reiter’s basic action theories can be captured in a dialect of PDL.
Its extension by the PDL program operators, called DL-PA, was further studied in [12,59].
We first describe that logic and then the embedding.
The language ofDL-PA is just as that ofPDL, except that atomic actions are not just abstract
names: they do something concrete, namely to assign formulas ϕ to propositional variables p.
Such assignments are written p:=ϕ. The original language only contains assignments of ⊤
and⊥; however, the more general assignment p:=ϕ can be considered to be an abbreviation
of (ϕ?; p:=⊤)∪(¬ϕ?; p:=⊥). For example,BlockAtL1 :=⊥makesBlockAtL1 false.We here
only present an axiomatisation of star-free DL-PA and refer the reader to the above papers
for the full logic. The four axiom schemas that have to be added to those of PDL are the
following:
〈p:=ϕ〉ψ ↔ [p:=ϕ]ψ
〈p:=ϕ〉p ↔ ϕ
q ↔ 〈p:=ϕ〉q for q = p
The first says that assignments are serial and deterministic. The second says that p is true
after the assignment of ϕ to p if and only if ϕ was true before. The third says that assignments
to p do not modify other variables.
Reasoning in DL-PA has several advantages over PDL: the logic is compact and has the
interpolation property; model checking has the same complexity as satisfiability checking;
theKleene star is eliminable (fromwhich it follows that everyDL-PA formula is reducible to a
boolean formula). Complexity of satisfiability is PSPACE complete for its star-free fragment
[59].
The fact that the execution of an assignment p:=ϕ leaves unchanged the truth values of
all those q that are different from p leads to a solution to the frame problem. For example,
the action i :moveBlockL1,L2 can be captured by the DL-PA program
i :moveBlockL1,L2 = (Repi :moveBlockL1,L2
?;Free?;BlockAtL1 :=⊥;BlockAtL2 :=⊤),
where we suppose that the propositional variables Repi :moveBlockL1,L2 and Free are true when
the action moveBlockL1,L2 is in agent i’s repertoire and when the block is free, respectively.
For that action, the formulas
BlockRed → [i :moveBlockL1,L2 ]BlockRed,
¬BlockRed → [i :moveBlockL1,L2 ]¬BlockRed
are both DL-PA theorems.
Let us make this precise. A successor state axiom ∀x
(
[x]p ↔ γp(x)
)
is explicit if for
every a that does not occur in γp(x), γp(a) ↔ p is a theorem of classical propositional logic.
For such actions [a]p ↔ p is therefore a theorem, which means that an action that does not
occur in γp(x) cannot modify p. Special cases are Reiter’s original definition of successor
state axioms [92] and local effect successor state axioms [118]. The successor state axiom
for BlockRed in Sect. 3.3 is clearly explicit.
The theorem below basically says that for explicit basic action theories, action a’s effects
according to Reiter are exactly the effects of the DL-PA assignment program
pia =
(
qa1 :=γqa1 (a); · · · ; q
a
n :=γqan (a)
)
,
where qa1 , . . . , q
a
n are all variables whose successor state axiom mentions a. It is formulated
for the extension PDL∀ of PDL by action variables, quantification and equality within which
we have presented Reiter’s solution in Sect. 3.3 and follows from Theorem 18 of [114].3
Theorem 1 Let ActionTheory be a set of explicit successor state axioms, one per proposi-
tional variable p. Let ϕ be some PDL formula. For each atomic program a, let {qa1 , . . . , q
a
n }
be the set of propositional variables qak such that a occurs in the successor state axiom for
3 We here give a simplified version; the original formulation is not about the above extension PDL∀ of PDL,
but about logic ES [70]. The latter is a variant of the Situation Calculus where situation terms are suppressed
(and which is therefore closer to modal logics) and which moreover comes with sensing actions and epistemic
operators.
qak and such that q
a
k occurs in ϕ. Let ϕ
′ result from replacing each abstract atomic action a
in ϕ by the complex assignment program pia =
(
qa1 :=γqa1 (a); · · · ; q
a
n :=γqan (a)
)
. Then
ActionTheory ⊢PDL∀ ϕ if and only if ⊢DL-PA ϕ
′.
The length of ϕ′ is quadratic in the length of ϕ, and the embedding of Reiter’s solution to
the frame problem is therefore polynomial [114, Theorem 27].
Onemight argue that the above result is not very impressive: after all, frameaxiomscan also
be encoded in PDL by systematically augmenting action theories with a polynomial number
of frame axioms. We have seen in the end of Sect. 3.2 that this however violates Reiter’s
criterion for a solution to the frame problem because the cardinality of the action theory is in
the order ofCard(P)×Card(I). In contrast, the encoding into DL-PA is satisfactory because
it is based on Card(A) action descriptions pia , one per action a ∈ A. Differently from PDL
and the Situation Calculus, these action descriptions appear directly in the formula, i.e., there
are no action names that are axiomatised separately in an action theory.
We view DL-PA as a sort of Assembler language for reasoning about change. Its applica-
bility to update and revision operations, planning tasks, argumentation theory and answer-set
programming has been demonstrated recently [33,36,54,62]. In the rest of the section we
show that it captures a logic of ability.
3.5 Coalition Logic of Propositional Control (CL-PC) and its embedding into DL-PA
Coalition Logic of Propositional Control (CL-PC) was introduced in [110,112]. It is a MAS
logic with nonstrategic actions that does not account for uncertainty. Just as in boolean
games [21,53], the idea is that each propositional variable is controlled by some agent. When
i controls p then i can modify the truth value of p at will. An action of i is therefore identified
with the change of some of i’s variables. It is supposed that control is not only exclusive—
each variable is controlled by at most one agent—, but also exhaustive —each variable is
controlled by at least one agent.
The language of CL-PC relates agents to outcomes. It has formulas of the form 〈J 〉ϕ,
read “group J can achieve ϕ by modifying its variables while the opponents don’t act”. The
dual [J ]ϕ may be read “group J cannot prevent ϕ”. The fact that i controls p can then be
expressed by the CL-PC formula 〈i〉p ∧ 〈i〉¬p.
We do not give the entire axiomatics of CL-PC here and refer the reader to [110]. Instead,
the principles of the logic will become clear through the embedding into DL-PA that we state
as Theorem 2. But let us first discuss two CL-PC theorems in order to limber up:
(
〈i〉p ∧ 〈i〉¬p
)
→ [i]
(
〈i〉p ∧ 〈i〉¬p
)
,(
〈i〉p ∧ 〈i〉q
)
→ 〈i〉(p∧q).
The first theorem says that an agent’s action repertoire is not changed by the performance
of actions. The second theorem comes from the fact that control is exercised over atomic
formulas and not over complex formulas. Note that these are theorems and not theorem
schemas; for example, the replacement of q by ¬p in the last formula results in a non-
theorem.
The focus of CL-PC is reasoning about nonstrategic (ceteris paribus) ability: given a set
of CL-PC formulas AbilityTheory describing the abilities of the different agents by means of
formulas of the form 〈i〉p ∧ 〈i〉¬p, one may check whether
AbilityTheory ⊢CL-PC Init → 〈{i1, . . . , in}〉Goal
holds, where Init describes some initial situation and Goal some goal. As the agents’ reper-
toires are not changed by the performance of actions, this is the same as
⊢CL-PC (AbilityTheory ∧ Init) → 〈{i1, . . . , in}〉Goal.
Let Pϕ be the set of propositional variables occurring in ϕ. For every agent i ∈ I and
variable p ∈ Pϕ , letCtrli,p be a fresh propositional variable (not occurring in ϕ); the intended
meaning of Ctrli,p is that i controls p. Then the formulas
Exclϕ =
∧
p∈Pϕ
∧
i, j∈I,i = j
¬(Ctrli,p ∧ Ctrl j,p),
Exhϕ =
∧
p∈Pϕ
∨
i∈I
Ctrli,p
describe exclusivity and exhaustivity of the control over Pϕ .
Given a set of agents J and a propositional variable p, we define the following program:
varyJ,p = ⊤? ∪
(( ∨
i∈J
Ctrli,p1
)
?; p1:=¬p1
)
.
It either does nothing or flips the truth value of p if p is under the control of one of J ’s
members. For example:
〈vary{i},p〉p =
〈
⊤? ∪ (Ctrli,p?; p:=¬p)
〉
p
↔ 〈⊤?〉p ∨ 〈Ctrli,p?〉 〈p:=¬p〉p
↔ p ∨ (Ctrli,p ∧ ¬p)
↔ p ∨ Ctrli,p.
Therefore [vary{i},p]p ↔ p ∧ ¬Ctrli,p . Then for a finite set of propositional variables
P = {p1, . . . , pn} ⊆ P, we define
varyJ,P = varyJ,p1; · · · ; varyJ,pn
which nondeterministically changes the truth value of some of the variables of P that are
under J ’s control.
The theorem below is a consequence of Theorems 4 and 5 of [59].
Theorem 2 Let ϕ be a CL-PC formula and let ϕ′ be the DL-PA formula resulting from
replacing each subformula 〈J 〉ψ of ϕ by 〈varyJ,Pψ 〉ψ . Then
⊢CL-PC ϕ if and only if ⊢DL-PA (Exhϕ ∧ Exclϕ) → ϕ
′.
Note that the length of ϕ′ is polynomial in that of ϕ.
3.6 Strategic reasoning in CL-PC
It was argued in [110] that in CL-PC one can also reason about strategic ability: as pointed out
there, theCL-PC formula
〈
J
〉
[J ]ϕ expresses that J can achieveϕ nextwhatever J ’s opponents
do. It is claimed that this captures at least the spirit of the formula 〈[J ]〉Xϕ of Pauly’s Coalition
Logic CL. Indeed, if we take a CL theorem and replace its strategic operators 〈[J ]〉X by
〈
J
〉
[J ]
then the resulting formula is a CL-PC theorem [110, Theorem 4.1].
In the rest of the section we have a look at the other direction.
Consider the following equivalence:
ϕ0 =
〈
J
〉
[J ](p∨q) ↔
〈
J
〉
[J ]p ∨
〈
J
〉
[J ]q
It basically says that if J can achieve p∨q whatever its opponents do then either J controls
p or J controls q . We are going to establish that it is a theorem of CL-PC. The difficult part
is to prove that ψ0 = [J ](p∨q) ↔ [J ]p ∨ [J ]q is a theorem of CL-PC; the rest follows by
principles of normal modal logics. We prove that
ψ ′0 = [varyJ ,{p,q}](p∨q) ↔ [varyJ ,{p}]p ∨ [varyJ ,{q}]q
is a theorem of DL-PA, from which it follows by Theorem 2 that ψ0 is a theorem of CL-PC.
The following equivalences are all theorems, where wewriteCtrlJ,p instead of
∨
i∈J Ctrli,p:
[varyJ ,{p}]p∨[varyJ ,{q}]q ↔
(
p∧¬CtrlJ ,p
)
∨
(
q∧¬CtrlJ ,q
)
↔
(
p ∧ (¬CtrlJ ,p∨¬p)
)
∨
(
q ∧ (¬CtrlJ ,q∨¬q)
)
↔ (p∨q) ∧
(
¬CtrlJ ,q∨p∨¬q
)
∧(
¬CtrlJ ,p∨¬p∨q
)
∧
(
¬CtrlJ ,p∨¬CtrlJ ,q∨¬p∨¬q
)
↔ [⊤?][⊤?](p∨q) ∧ [CtrlJ ,q?](p∨¬q) ∧
[CtrlJ ,p?](¬p∨q) ∧ [CtrlJ ,p?][CtrlJ ,q?](¬p∨¬q)
↔ [⊤? ∪
(
CtrlJ ,p?; p:=¬p
)
][⊤? ∪
(
CtrlJ ,q?; q:=¬q
)
] (p∨q)
= [varyJ ,{p,q}](p∨q)
Soψ ′0 is a theorem ofDL-PA. Thereforeψ0 is a theorem ofCL-PC, and so is ϕ0. Let us now
reformulate ϕ0 with the modal operator of CL: we get 〈[J ]〉X(p∨q) ↔ 〈[J ]〉Xp ∨ 〈[J ]〉Xq .
This however fails to be a theorem of CL, as we will see in the next section (Sect. 4.1). We
thereby complete Theorem 4.1 of [110]: the above ϕ0 exemplifies that the other way round,
there are unprovable CL formulas whose CL-PC counterpart is a theorem.
In the next section we are going to have a closer look at the logic of strategic ability ATL,
of which CL is a fragment.
4 No uncertainty, strategic actions: ATL and STIT
In a strategic interpretation, the sentence “coalition J is able to achieve ϕ” is understood
as “J is able to achieve ϕ whatever J ’s opponents do”. In the present section we discuss
one of the main logics with a strategic interpretation of action modalities: Alternating-time
Temporal Logic (ATL). We also briefly discuss Belnap’s Seeing-To-It-That Logic (STIT),
which is not only about what an agent can do, but also about what an agent does.
4.1 Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL)
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) was introduced as a logic for distributed systems
[5]. Just as those of CL-PC, the modal operators of ATL relate actions to outcomes. They
combine an action modality with three temporal modalities: the formula 〈[J ]〉Xϕ reads “the
agents in J have a strategy such that whatever the opponents do, next ϕ”; 〈[J ]〉Gϕ reads “the
agents in J have a strategy such that whatever the opponents do, henceforth ϕ”; and 〈[J ]〉ϕUψ
reads “the agents in J have a strategy such that whatever the opponents do, ϕ untilψ”. These
are fused modal operators: the strategy quantifier 〈[J ]〉 is followed by one of the temporal
operators X, G, or U. The latter stem from Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL). Similarly
Table 5 Axiomatisation of ATL
RE(〈[J]〉)
ϕ ↔ ϕ′
〈[J ]〉Xϕ → 〈[J ]〉Xϕ′
M(〈[J]〉) 〈[J ]〉X(ϕ ∧ ψ) →
(
〈[J ]〉Xϕ ∧ 〈[J ]〉Xϕ
)
N(〈[J]〉) 〈[J ]〉X⊤
D(〈[J]〉) ¬〈[J ]〉X⊥
Alt(〈[I]〉) ¬〈[∅]〉X¬ϕ → 〈[I]〉Xϕ
S(〈[J]〉)
(
〈[J1]〉Xϕ1 ∧ 〈[J2]〉Xϕ2
)
→ 〈[J1 ∪ J2]〉X(ϕ1∧ϕ2) if J1 ∩ J2 = ∅
FP(G) 〈[J ]〉Gϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ 〈[J ]〉X〈[J ]〉Gϕ
GFP(G) 〈[∅]〉G
(
θ → (ϕ ∧ 〈[J ]〉Xθ)
)
→ 〈[∅]〉G
(
θ → 〈[J ]〉Gϕ
)
FP(U) 〈[J ]〉ψUϕ ↔ ϕ ∨
(
ψ ∧ 〈[J ]〉X〈[J ]〉ψUϕ
)
LFP(U) 〈[∅]〉G
(
(ϕ ∨ (ψ ∧ 〈[J ]〉Xθ)) → θ
)
→ 〈[∅]〉G(〈[J ]〉ψUϕ → θ)
to LTL, the formula 〈[J ]〉Fϕ can be introduced as an abbreviation of 〈[J ]〉⊤Uϕ. It therefore
reads “the agents in J have a strategy such that whatever the other agents do, eventually ϕ”.
Table 5 contains the axiomatisation of ATL [45].4 The modal operators of ATL are not
normal: for example, one cannot prove (〈[J ]〉Xϕ ∨ 〈[J ]〉Xψ) → 〈[J ]〉X(ϕ ∨ ψ), which is the
conjunction axiom schema C (cf. Sect. 3.1). ATL is a so-called monotonic modal logic [29]:
the monotony schema M holds for 〈[J ]〉X (that has the form of PDL’s schema C, cf. Table 4).
The failure of the C schema is due to the fact that 〈[J ]〉X contains an existential quantification
followed by a universal quantification. The superadditivity schema S(〈[J]〉) is central. It says
that the abilities of disjoint coalitions J1 and J2 can be combined: if J1 is able to achieve ϕ1
and J2 is able to achieve ϕ2 then J1 and J2 together are able to achieve ϕ1∧ϕ2. Just as PDL,
ATL has a deduction theorem:
χ ⊢ATL ϕ iff ⊢ATL 〈[I]〉Gχ → ϕ.
To decide the satisfiability of an ATL formula is an EXPTIME complete problem [120].
The language of Coalition Logic (CL) [88] is the fragment of the language of ATLwithout
G and U. It was proved in [44] that ATL is a conservative extension of CL. To decide the
satisfiability of a CL formula is a PSPACE complete problem.
As we have already mentioned in Sect. 3.6, the nonstrategic CL-PC formula 〈J 〉[J ]ϕ
of CL-PC is similar in spirit to the strategic formula 〈[J ]〉Xϕ. However, they do not have
exactly the same meaning. Consider the CL equivalence χ0 = 〈[J ]〉X(p∨q) ↔ (〈[J ]〉Xp ∨
〈[J ]〉Xq). We have seen in Sect. 3.6 that its CL-PC counterpart ϕ0 is a theorem. However,
if p and q are different then the left-to-right direction is neither provable in CL nor in
ATL. To see this, suppose 〈[J ]〉X(p∨q) ↔ (〈[J ]〉Xp ∨ 〈[J ]〉Xq) was provable in CL. Then
〈[∅]〉X(p∨¬p) ↔ (〈[∅]〉Xp ∨ 〈[∅]〉X¬p) would be provable for any variable p by the rule of
uniform substitution, which is derivable in CL. By Axiom N(〈[J]〉) and Rule RE(〈[J]〉) its left
hand side 〈[∅]〉X(p∨¬p) is a theorem and therefore 〈[∅]〉Xp∨〈[∅]〉X¬pwould be provable for
any p: the empty coalition would be able to achieve either p or¬p, for every p. Worse, by the
4 Actually we give an equivalent axiomatisation that better matches the other axiomatisations in this paper:
our RE(〈[J]〉) and M(〈[J]〉) do not appear in the original presentation, while 〈[∅]〉G⊤ and the inference rules
ϕ
〈[∅]〉Gϕ
and ϕ → ψ
〈[∅]〉Xϕ → 〈[∅]〉Xψ
are missing in ours. The first can be proved from N(〈[J]〉) via RE(〈[J]〉)
and the Greatest Fixpoint Axiom GFP(G). The second can be derived from the first via RE(〈[J]〉). The third
can be derived from M(〈[J]〉) via RE(〈[J]〉).
monotony axiomM(〈[J]〉)wewould obtain the theorem
( ∧
J⊆I 〈[J ]〉Xp
)
∨
( ∧
J⊆I 〈[J ]〉X¬p
)
:
all coalitions would have exactly the same power. This would make CL an uninteresting logic
of strategic ability. We conclude that While we agree with van der Hoek andWooldridge that
CL-PC is an interesting logic that captures the spirit of CL, the formulas ϕ0 and χ0 highlight a
mismatch between the two logics that can be traced back to the assumption underlyingCL-PC
that the agents’ actions are modifications of the truth values of propositional variables. We
note that ϕ0 is not a schema, i.e., not every instance of it is a theorem. This poses the question
whether CL-PC and CL differ by the status of some schema. We conjecture that no such
schema exists.
The language of the logic ATL∗ is more liberal than that of ATL: fused modal operators
such as 〈[J ]〉X are decomposed into the strategy quantifier 〈[J ]〉 and the temporal operator X.
The strategy quantifier can therefore be followed by arbitrary so-called path formulas, such
as in 〈[{i}]〉(p∧Xp) or 〈[{i}]〉G(p∧¬G¬p). To decide the satisfiability of an ATL∗ formula
is a 2EXPTIME complete problem [97]. The language of the logic of ‘seeing-to-it-that’
(STIT) is even more liberal: the strategy quantifier 〈[J ]〉 is decomposed into an existential
quantification over historic possibilities that is followed by a universal quantification over
the outcomes of J ’s choices. We will introduce STIT in Sect. 4.3.
4.2 Reasoning about strategies in ATL: commitments and irrevocable strategies
One can describe an agent’s action repertoire (and therefore his abilities) in ATL by stating
the conditioned effects of each of the agent’s actions. Such formulas take the form Cond →
〈[{i}]〉XEffect. This supposes that actions take a single time step and are performed by a single
agent. (More general temporal postconditions and statements of joint ability are however
possible, too.) A set of such formulas makes up a theory of ability AbilityTheory. Given
AbilityTheory, one can typically check whether given some description of the initial state
Init, a coalition of agents {i1, . . . , in} is able to achieve some goalGoal in the future, whatever
the opponents do. Formally, we check whether
AbilityTheory ⊢ATL Init → 〈[{i1, . . . , in}]〉FGoal
is the case.
While the modal operators of ATL provide an elegant and compact tool to talk about what
coalitions are able to achieve against their opponents bymeans of strategies, strategies remain
“unsung heroes” [108]: there are no names for strategies in the language and one cannot really
‘grasp’ them.Many authors felt that this is not satisfactory and extended ATL. Strategy Logic
(SL) [28,85] has strategy variables and quantification over strategies; it is undecidable. The
strategy quantifier of ATL with explicit strategies [121,123] is indexed by strategy names σ
committing some of the agents to follow some particular strategy. For example, the formula
〈[{Ann}]〉Bob:σGMarried says that if Bob is committed to follow the strategy σ of staying
faithful then Ann has a strategy ensuring that both stay married forever. Commitment to a
strategy was later replaced by commitment to an action in ATL with Explicit Actions ATLEA
[61]. Both ATL with explicit strategies and ATLEA have the same complexity as ATL. The
aim of this line of work is to index the ATL strategy quantifier with complex PDL programs.
It should in particular provide a dynamic operator with a strategic interpretation; such an
operator is missing up to now. The logic ATL with intentions, ATLI, of [68] has a modal
operator of commitment to a strategy as a first-class citizen: (striσi ) ϕ reads “if i intends to
play according to strategy σi then ϕ is true”. This is further refined in [27] into a logic ATL
with preferences, ATLP, where one can express that agents play some equilibrium.
Introducing commitments into ATL is a way of solving the problem of reasoning with
uniform strategies which plagues the epistemic extension of ATL, ATEL. We will discuss
this in Sect. 7.
Commitments can also be related to the problem of revocability of ATL strategies. Indeed,
in ATL an agent i may adopt some strategy and cancel (‘revoke’) it at a later stage. In other
words, i is never really committed to any strategy. This can be illustrated by the example of
Ann andBobwhohave in their repertoire the joint action of divorcing, as expressed by theATL
formula 〈[{Ann,Bob}]〉X¬Married. Their repertoire also contains the action of staying mar-
ried (that should perhaps better be called a non-action):Married → 〈[{Ann,Bob}]〉XMarried.
When AbilityTheory contains these two formulas then we have
AbilityTheory ⊢ATL Married → 〈[{Ann,Bob}]〉G
(
Married ∧ 〈[{Ann,Bob}]〉X¬Married
)
.
So according to ATL, once Ann and Bob are married they have a strategy that (1) makes
them stay married forever, and (2) allows them to abandon that strategy and to divorce at
any time point. In other words, when we look at the outcome of Ann and Bob’s strategy
to stay together forever then we never exclude that they deviate from that strategy. Several
authors felt that this is an undesirable property. Beyond the above logics with names for
strategies there are two approaches that avoid the introduction of names for strategies: ATL
with irrevocable strategies [1] and ATL with strategy contexts [22]. The latter makes the
adoption and canceling of strategies explicit. Its satisfiability problem was proved to be
undecidable in [104].
4.3 Seeing-To-It-That Logic (STIT)
WhilePDL andATL are aboutwhat agents can do,STIT [19,64] is both aboutwhat agents can
do and about what they actually do. Such logics are called logics of agency in the philosophy
of action literature. We here present the so-called Chellas STIT version.
The central device in the logical language are formulas of the form StitJϕ, read “by their
current choices the agents in J guarantee that ϕ is true, whatever the other agents do”. There
is also an operator of historical possibility ♦ϕ, read “it is historically possible that ϕ”. Its
dual is defined asϕ
def
= ¬♦¬ϕ and is read “ϕ is historically true” or “ϕ is settled true”. The
language finally has the linear-time temporal operators F (‘eventually’) andG (‘henceforth’).
Several more recent publications also include the temporal ‘next’ operator X [24].
The operator of historical possibility can be used to quantify over the agents’ choices:
the formula ♦StitJϕ says that J is able to achieve ϕ whatever the other agents do. So this
construction resembles theATL path quantifier 〈[J ]〉, and it is not very surprising thatCoalition
Logic CL becomes a fragment of Chellas STIT if we translate 〈[J ]〉Xϕ into ♦StitJXϕ [24].
An embedding of the entire language of ATL into Horty’s strategic variant of STIT can be
found in the same paper. It has to be noted that the operator of historic possibility is actually
redundant if one admits empty coalitions:ϕ can then be viewed as an abbreviation ofStit∅ϕ.
So ϕ is historically necessary if the empty coalition sees to it that ϕ.
The agency operators StitJ are normal modal box operators satisfying the principles of
S5. The operator of historic possibility is a normal modal diamond operator also satisfying
the principles of S5. Historic necessity of ϕ implies that every coalition sees to it that ϕ: the
formula ϕ → StitJϕ is a theorem of Chellas STIT. Just as in ATL, agents and disjoint
coalitions of agents are supposed to be independent. This is axiomatised for individuals by a
family of axiom schemas of independence of agents [19, Chapter 17] that resembles ATL’s
superadditivity:
AIAn(♦,Stiti)(♦Stiti1ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦Stitinϕn) → ♦(Stiti1ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Stitinϕn)
A somewhat surprising consequence of this axiom is the theorem StitiStit jϕ → ϕ, for
i = j , in words: i can make j see to it that ϕ only if ϕ is settled true. It even turns out that
a generalisation of that implication can replace the above axiom of independence of agents
[11].
In STIT one can reason about responsibility and causality: one may check whether the
coalition J is responsible for some state of affairs Fact in context Cond by checking whether
the formula
Cond → StitJFact
is a STIT theorem. When this is the case then it is also said that J is agentive for Fact under
the circumstances Cond.
Several authors have argued that a better account of agency is provided by the so-called
deliberative stit operator that can be defined from Chellas’s stit operator by means of the
following abbreviation:
DStitJ ϕ
def
= StitJϕ ∧ ♦¬ϕ.
Their argument is that StitJ⊤ is a theorem of Chellas STIT: every group is agentive for a
tautology. This is not the case for the deliberative stit operator: on the contrary, ¬(StitJ⊤∧
♦¬⊤) is a theorem of Chellas STIT, i.e., no group can be agentive for a tautology.
There is a price to pay for generality: satisfiability of STIT formulas is undecidable
already for the language without temporal operators [56]. It is decidable if coalitions are
restricted to individuals, and deciding satisfiability is NEXPTIME complete [11].
5 Individual knowledge, no actions: S5
Wenow turn to something completely different: the logic of individual knowledge.We briefly
recall the logic that is generally considered to be the standard logic of knowledge, viz. the
modal logic S5, and show that it is too strong.
5.1 S5 as an epistemic logic
The logic of individual knowledge has modal operators Ki , one per agent i in I. The formula
Kiϕ reads “agent i knows that ϕ”. Sometimes a dual modal operator Kˆi is used: Kˆiϕ is
equivalent to ¬Ki¬ϕ and reads “ϕ is consistent with i’s knowledge”.
Starting with Moore [86] and Fagin et al. [35], most of the publications in computer
science adopt the modal logic S5 as the logic of knowledge. We give its axiomatisation in
Table 6.
As we have already mentioned in Sect. 3.1, the axiom schemas M(Ki) and C(Ki) can be
replaced by the K(Ki)-axiom
(
Kiϕ ∧ Ki (ϕ→ψ)
)
→ Kiψ . Each of the principles RE(Ki),
N(Ki), and K(Ki) corresponds to an aspect of the omniscience problem: RE(Ki) says that
an agent’s knowledge is closed under logical equivalence; N(Ki) says that the agents know
the tautologies; K(Ki) says that an agent’s knowledge is closed under modus ponens. Axiom
T(Ki) says that knowledge implies truth and distinguishes knowledge from belief. Axiom
4(Ki) is the axiom of positive introspection and5(Ki) is the axiom of negative introspection.
Table 6 Axiomatisation of the
epistemic logic S5
RE(Ki)
ϕ ↔ ϕ′
Kiϕ ↔ Kiϕ
′
N(Ki) Ki⊤
M(Ki) Ki (ϕ ∧ ψ) →
(
Kiϕ ∧ Kiψ
)
C(Ki)
(
Kiϕ ∧ Kiψ
)
→ Ki (ϕ ∧ ψ)
T(Ki) Kiϕ → ϕ
4(Ki) Kiϕ → KiKiϕ
5(Ki) ¬Kiϕ → Ki¬Kiϕ
Up to today, S5 is considered to be ‘the’ logic of knowledge in theoretical computer
science, artificial intelligence, and dynamic epistemic logics. However, in the formal epis-
temology literature one can find strong arguments that S5’s negative introspection axiom
makes it too strong a logic of knowledge. We go into the details in the next section.
5.2 Negative introspection is undesirable!
Among others, Lenzen and Voorbraak have provided formal arguments that Axiom 5(Ki) of
negative introspection is not a desirable property of a knowledge operator [43,72,73,119].
Perhaps the most striking argument involves its interaction with a modality of strong belief
Bi , called conviction by Lenzen, where the formula Biϕ reads “agent i (strongly) believes
that ϕ”. The only reasoning principles that we need are Kiϕ → Biϕ (knowledge implies
belief), and ¬Bi⊥ (belief is consistent). The latter is the modal D(Bi) axiom and can be
replaced by (Biϕ∧Bi¬ϕ) →⊥. Below we give a slightly modified version of the argument.
Suppose¬p∧BiKi p is the case: i wrongly believes to know that p. Let us prove that such
a hypothesis leads to inconsistency:
1. ¬p → ¬Ki p (contraposition of Axiom T(Ki))
2. ¬Ki p → Ki¬Ki p (Axiom 5(Ki))
3. Ki¬Ki p → Bi¬Ki p (‘knowledge implies belief’)
4. ¬p → Bi¬Ki p (from 1, 2, 3 by propositional logic)
5. (¬p∧BiKi p) → (BiKi p ∧ Bi¬Ki p) (from 4 by propositional logic)
6. (BiKi p ∧ Bi¬Ki p) →⊥ (Axiom D(Bi))
7. (¬p∧BiKi p) →⊥ (from 5, 6 by propositional logic)
The last line says that no agent can wrongly believe to know p. This is against our intuitions:
one may believe to know that p, and even strongly so, but may nevertheless be wrong.
Lenzen proposed that Axiom 5(Ki) should be replaced by the weaker ¬Ki¬Kiϕ →
Ki¬Ki¬ϕ, which is perhaps better readable as Kˆi Kiϕ → Ki Kˆi ϕ and is called Axiom .2(Ki)
in the modal logic literature [72]. The resulting modal logic is called S4.2 and is Lenzen’s
‘official’ logic of knowledge.Meyer and van der Hoek proposed the stronger logic S4.3 [83].
We will see in the next section that the move to S4.2 creates some new difficulties when we
integrate dynamic operators.
6 Individual knowledge, nonstrategic actions: PAL
Starting with [86], many authors studied the interplay of knowledge and action.We here con-
centrate on the interplay of knowledge and epistemic events, which only change the agents’
knowledge while leaving the facts unchanged. (The term ‘epistemic action’ became stan-
dard in the literature, however, ‘event’ is more appropriate because it is supposed that the
Table 7 Axiomatisation of PAL
EL Some axiomatics of epistemic logic
(e.g. S5 of Table 6)
RE(〈ϕ!〉)
ψ ↔ ψ ′
〈ϕ!〉ψ ↔ 〈ϕ!〉ψ ′
Dual(〈ϕ!〉) [ϕ!]ψ ↔ ¬〈ϕ!〉¬ψ
Red(p) 〈ϕ!〉p ↔ ϕ∧p, for p atomic
Red(¬) 〈ϕ!〉¬ψ ↔ ϕ∧¬〈ϕ!〉ψ
Red(∧) 〈ϕ!〉(ψ1∧ψ2) ↔ 〈ϕ!〉ψ1∧〈ϕ!〉ψ2
Red(Ki) 〈ϕ!〉Kiψ ↔ ϕ∧Ki [ϕ!]ψ
announcement is made either by the environment or by some agent that is not part of what is
being modelled.) They behave just as expansion operations in Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and
Makinson’s AGM belief revision theory [3]. The resulting dynamic epistemic logics were
intensely studied in the last decade. We here present the simplest dynamic epistemic logic:
PAL.
6.1 Public Announcement Logic (PAL)
Public Announcement Logic (PAL) extends epistemic logic by dynamic operators 〈ϕ!〉 of
public announcement of the truth ofϕ. The formula 〈ϕ!〉ψ reads “the truthful public announce-
ment of ϕ can be made and ψ will be true afterwards”. The dual [ϕ!]ψ is read “if the truthful
public announcement of ϕ is made then ψ will be true afterwards”. Announcements only
change the agents’ knowledge, but not the facts.
The axiomatics of PAL is in Table 7. It follows the presentation in [13]. Axiom Red(p)
says that announcements leave the facts unchanged. The equivalences Red(¬), Red(∧), and
Red(Ki) are reduction axioms: together with Rule RE(〈ϕ!〉) they allow to push dynamic
operators inwards until they face atomic formulas. Then Red(p) allows to entirely eliminate
the dynamic operators. Observe that the reduction axioms [ϕ!]Kiψ ↔ ϕ→Ki [ϕ!]ψ and
[ϕ!]p ↔ ψ→p can be respectively proved from Red(Ki) and Red(¬) and from Red(p)
and Red(¬).
Here is a much debated theorem of PAL: [p∧¬Ki p!]Ki p. Indeed, by the reduction
axioms it is successively equivalent to (p∧¬Ki p) → Ki [p∧¬Ki p!]p and to (p∧¬Ki p) →
Ki
(
(p∧¬Ki p)→p
)
, and the latter is a theorem of any normal modal logic because the right
hand side of the implication is so. So after the announcement of p∧¬Ki p it is true that Ki p:
the formula p∧¬Ki p becomes false by the announcement. This so-called Moore sentence
illustrates that even if what is announced is true before the announcement, it may become
false by its mere announcement. Such formulas have been called unsuccessful. In contrast,
non-epistemic formulas are always successful. More generally, if ϕ is a formula without any
negative occurrence of epistemic operators then [ϕ!]ϕ is a theorem of PAL.
The complexity of satisfiability of PAL formulas is the same as that of the underlying
epistemic logicEL [81]. It was also shown there that if EL equals K then PAL is more succinct
than EL. This was generalised by French et al. to other epistemic logics, including S5 [38].
6.2 The problem of closure under updates in PAL
When it comes to choosing the epistemic logic underlying PAL, almost all authors either opt
for S5 or for the basic modal logic K. This ‘works’ because both S5-based PAL and K-based
PAL are conservative extensions of S5 and K: their theorems without the announcement
operator coincide. Basically, the reason is that the axioms for the announcement operator do
not interfere with the axioms of the epistemic logic. This fails to hold for other epistemic
logics: PAL extensions of many logics that are intermediate between K and S5 fail to be
conservative extensions. This applies in particular to the logic of beliefKD45 and to Lenzen’s
official logic of knowledge S4.2: their extensions by the reduction axioms of PAL of Table 7
turn out to augment the theorems of the underlying epistemic logic [13]. Let us demonstrate
this by showing that in the PAL extension of the logic of belief KD45 one can prove the
knowledge axiom T(Ki).
1. ⊥ ↔ Ki⊥ (KD45)
2. 〈¬ϕ!〉⊥ ↔ 〈¬ϕ!〉Ki⊥ (from (1) by RE(〈ϕ!〉)
3. ¬〈¬ϕ!〉⊥ (by Red(∧), Red(¬), Red(p))
4. ¬〈¬ϕ!〉Ki⊥ (from (2), (3) by propositional logic)
5. ¬
(
¬ϕ ∧ Ki [¬ϕ!]⊥
)
(from (4) by Red(Ki))
6. [¬ϕ!]⊥ ↔ ϕ (by Red(∧), Red(¬), Red(p))
7. ¬
(
¬ϕ ∧ Kiϕ
)
(from (5), (6) by substitution of equivalents)
8. Kiϕ → ϕ (from (7) by propositional logic)
This disqualifies KD45-based PAL as a logic of belief dynamics. It is currently not clear
how this problem has to be addressed
6.3 Variants of PAL
Public Announcement Logic (PAL) turned out to be extremely fruitful. We briefly mention
here some of its extensions in order to be able to refer to them in the sequel.
PAL being about epistemic actions only, it was extended by assignments in several papers
[69,106,114,115,117]. It was shown in the latter two papers that the epistemic extension of
Reiter’s solution to the frame problem [95,96] can be captured in the extension of DL-PA by
epistemic operators and public announcements.
While PAL announcements are public, starting with [42] several authors undertook to
relax that hypothesis. Most prominently, dynamic epistemic logics [14] have event models
which model that agents perceive events only incompletely.
Group Announcement Logic (GAL) is an extension of PAL by group announcements [2].
It actually blends PAL’s announcements with an ATL-like ability operator involving a group
of agents. The formula 〈J 〉ψ reads “J can achieveψ by announcing some known formulas”.
Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic (APAL) is an extension of PAL by arbitrary
announcements [10]. Formulas involving the latter take the form 〈!〉ψ and are read “there is
a ϕ such that 〈ϕ!〉ψ”. APAL provides a formal framework for the analysis of the knowability
paradox, also known as the Fitch paradox. The paradox—or rather, the problem—is that if
we add to APAL the prima facie reasonable principle that all truths are knowable, formally
ϕ → 〈!〉Kiϕ, then ϕ → Kiϕ can be proved. Indeed, (ϕ ∧ ¬Kiϕ) → 〈!〉Ki (ϕ ∧ ¬Kiϕ)
is an instance of the knowability principle whose right hand side is inconsistent because
Ki (ϕ ∧ ¬Kiϕ) is so in S5. In other words, while APAL is a conservative extension of PAL,
the extension of APAL by the knowability principle fails to be a conservative extension of
PAL and also of the underlying epistemic logic (unless the latter has ϕ → Kkϕ as a theorem).
The satisfiability problem of APAL is undecidable [37]. In the next section we show that one
cannot reason about uniform choices in APAL.
6.4 The problem of uniform choice in APAL
The problem of uniform choice was up to now only studied in logics with a strategic
interpretation of actions. It however already occurs with nonstrategic action operators as
or
B C B C
Fig. 1 Two possible alternative situations for agent Y
soon as they quantify existentially over action choices. We call this the problem of uni-
form choice: the problem of how to express in the logical language that an agent knows
how to achieve some ϕ. This implies that the agent also knows that there is a choice
of his achieving ϕ, but not the other way round. Here is an example illustrating this in
APAL.
Suppose you (Y ) know that there are only two cards, the ace of spades and the ace of
diamonds. Bob (B) and Cath (C) each hold one of these two. You don’t see B’s and C’s
cards, and they only see their own cards; so if Bob holds the ace of spades then he does not
know that the other card is an ace of diamonds, and so on. There are two alternative situations
for you: one where Bob holds spades and Cath holds diamonds, and one where Bob holds
diamonds and Cath holds spades; they are depicted in Fig. 1.
Suppose you want B to know C’s card, but not the other way round. Is there a public
announcement doing the job?
We start by describing the initial situation and the goal situation:
Init = KY Spades ∧ KYDiamonds ∧ KY
(
(KBSpades ∧ ¬KCSpades) ∨
(KBDiamonds ∧ ¬KCDiamonds)
)
Goal = KB(Spades ∧ Diamonds) ∧ ¬KC (Spades ∧ Diamonds)
where Spadesmeans that one of agents B andC holds the spades and similarly forDiamonds.
The following are theorems of PAL:
⊢PAL (KBSpades ∧ ¬KCSpades) → 〈Spades→Diamonds!〉Goal
⊢PAL (KBDiamonds ∧ ¬KCDiamonds) → 〈Diamonds→Spades!〉Goal
So if B holds the ace of spades then the announcement Spades→Diamonds! does the job;
and if B holds the ace of diamonds then the announcementDiamonds→Spades! does the job.
It follows that ⊢APAL Init → KY 〈∃!〉Goal: given the initial situation Init, you know that there
is an announcement achieving the goal. However, you don’t know which announcement you
should make. Our example is a typical situation where you know that there is a strategy, but
you don’t know which action to choose. There seems to be no way to express in APAL that
there is no uniform choice guaranteeing the goal.
The problem can be solved in GAL, where one can write both KY
〈
{Y }
〉
ϕ and
〈
{Y }
〉
KYϕ.
The former says that you know that you have a (possibly non-uniform) choice achieving ϕ,
while the latter says that you have a (necessarily uniform) choice of which you know that it
achieves ϕ.
7 Individual knowledge, strategic actions: ATEL
We now briefly turn towards a paradigmatic logic of knowledge and strategic action:
Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) [109]. ATEL combines ATL with epis-
temic logic. It has formulas of the form 〈[J ]〉ψ where ψ is a formula governed by a temporal
operator just as inATL (cf. Sect. 4.1), read “coalition J can achieveψ (whatever its opponents
do)”, and Kiϕ, read “agent i ∈ I knows that ϕ”.
It was pointed out by Schobbens that in ATEL one cannot represent uniform strategies
[98]. The problem is basically the same as APAL’s problem of uniform choice that we have
exposed in Sect. 6.4, viz. to design a logical language allowing to express that an agent
knows a strategy to enforce some property, which is stronger a statement than that the agent
knows that there is a strategy; in the latter case he does not necessarily know what strat-
egy to select. Indeed, it is irrelevant whether there is a quantification over the opponents’
actions or not: the problem rather comes from the existential quantification occurring in
the modal operators of ability. It may be exemplified in the language of ATEL by the for-
mula Ki 〈[i]〉XSafeOpen which expresses that agent i knows that there is an action of his
opening the safe: the formula may be true without agent i knowing the combination of the
safe.
Following Schobbens’s paper, several amendments of ATEL where proposed in the lit-
erature in order to allow to express uniformity of strategies. It seems fair to say that
the accounts they propose are fairly complex: Constructive Strategic Logic [66] evalu-
ates formulas not at state but at a set of states, leading to a non-standard negation opera-
tor; Alternating-time Temporal Observation Logic (ATOL) [67] has formulas with indexed
path quantifiers 〈[J ]〉Obs(i)ψ “group J has a strategy to enforce ψ , and agent i can see the
strategy”.
Perhaps the most promising solutions are provided by extensions of ATL framework
with strategic contexts. In the language of ATEL with Explicit Actions ATELEA [61],
which is the epistemic extension of logic ATLEA of Sect. 4.2, one might write for example
Ki 〈[i]〉i :dial1234XSa f eOpen in order to express that i knows the combination of the safe. A
further step in this direction is Epistemic Strategy Logic ESL [18] where Strategy Logic SL
is extended with epistemic operators.
It has also been proposed to solve the problem of uniform strategies by moving to an
epistemic extension of the logic of agency STIT [23,25,57]. The language of that logic has
four kinds of modal operators: the epistemic operator Ki , the historic possibility operator ♦,
the agency operator Stiti, and temporal operators X etc. As we have said in Sect. 4.3, the
sequence ♦StitiX captures the ATL operator 〈[i]〉X. The difference is that 〈[i]〉X is a single,
fused operator while in STIT it is decomposed into its three constituents. This provides a
greater linguistic flexibility because the epistemic operatorKi can be inserted anywhere in the
sequence. First, the formula Ki♦StitiXϕ is what can be said in ATEL about agent i’s de dicto
knowledge, while the formula ♦KiStitiXϕ is about i’s de re knowledge; it cannot be formu-
lated in ATEL. In our example, the conjunctionKi♦StitiX SafeOpen∧¬♦KiStitiX SafeOpen
adequately expresses that i knows that there is an action opening the safe, but does not know
which action opens it: there no choice of an action for which i knows that i sees to it that
the safe is open next. In the case of multiple agents the picture can be further refined by
distinguishing i’s ex ante knowledge—what i knows before choosing his action—, i’s inter-
mediate knowledge—what i knows given that he has chosen his action but does not know
the other agents’ choices—, and i’s ex post knowledge—what i knows once all the agents’
choices are known to him [80].
8 Group knowledge, no actions: S5CK
The concept of common knowledge is central in several disciplines. In the social sciences
it is the basis of conventions [74]. In semantics it provides the notion of common ground in
Table 8 Axiomatisation of
epistemic logics with common
knowledge ELCK
EL Some axiomatics of epistemic logic
FP(CKJ) EKJCKJϕ ↔ EKJ (ϕ ∧ CKJϕ)
GFP(CKJ)
(
EKJϕ ∧ CKJ (ϕ → EKJϕ)
)
→ CKJϕ
conversation [30]. In game theory, the hypothesis of common knowledge of rationality was
proved to be fundamental for equilibria [9]. In theoretical computer science it is used to study
communication in distributed systems [35].
The language has common knowledge operators CKJ , one per group J ⊆ I. The formula
CKJϕ is read “it is common knowledge in group J that ϕ”.
As we have said in Sect. 2.1, common knowledge of ϕ, CKJϕ, is typically explained
in terms of the modal operator of shared knowledge EKJ as being the infinite conjunction
EKJϕ ∧ EKJEKJϕ ∧ EKJEKJEKJϕ ∧ · · · . However, due to this infiniteness CKJ cannot
be syntactically reduced to EKJ and requires a proper axiomatisation. Most of the axiomati-
sations in the literature are built on top of the epistemic logic S5. Given that we have stressed
the inappropriateness of the latter as a logic of knowledge in Sect. 5.2, the axiomatics we give
in Table 8 is based on a non-specified normal modal logic of individual knowledge EL that
may be any modal logic between K and S5. It is obtained by adding two axioms to the logic
of individual knowledge EL: the Fixpoint Axiom FP(CKJ) and the Greatest Fixpoint Axiom
GFP(CKJ). Both involve shared knowledge EKJϕ, which as we have mentioned in Sect.
2.1 abbreviates
∧
i∈J Kiϕ. Axiom GFP(CKJ) can be replaced by the following inference
rule:
It can be proved that CKJ is a normal modal operator. We observe that the formula
CK{1,2}
((
ϕ1↔ϕ2
)
∧
∧
i∈{1,2}
(
ϕi→Kiϕi
))
→ CK{1,2}
((
ϕ1∧ϕ2
)
→ EK{1,2}
(
ϕ1∧ϕ2
))
is a theorem of ELCK if EL is a normal modal logic. It says that if it is common knowledge
that ϕ1 and ϕ2 have the same truth value and that each agent i knows the truth value of ‘his’
ϕi then it is common knowledge that if both are true then everybody knows this. Here is a
proof.
1.
(∧
i∈{1,2}
(
ϕi→Kiϕi
))
→
((
ϕ1∧ϕ2
)
→ EK{1,2}
(
ϕ1∨ϕ2
))
(by EL)
2.
(
CK{1,2}
∧
i∈{1,2}
(
ϕi→Kiϕi
))
→ CK{1,2}
((
ϕ1∧ϕ2
)
→ EK{1,2}
(
ϕ1∨ϕ2
))
(from (1) with CKJ normal modal operator)
3. CK{1,2}
(
ϕ1↔ϕ2
)
→ CK{1,2}EK{1,2}
(
(ϕ1∨ϕ2) → (ϕ1∧ϕ2)
)
(FP(CKJ) with CKJ normal modal operator)
4. CK{1,2}
((
ϕ1↔ϕ2
)
∧
∧
i∈{1,2}
(
ϕi→Kiϕi
))
→ CK{1,2}
((
ϕ1∧ϕ2
)
→ EK{1,2}
(
ϕ1∧ϕ2
))
(from (2) and (3) with CKJ normal modal operator)
We are going to use that theorem in the next section where we are going to discuss a property
of Axiom GFP(CKJ) that we find debatable.
9 Group knowledge, nonstrategic actions: PALCK
We now study the extension of PAL by the common knowledge operator as a prototypical
logic involving both group knowledge and nonstrategic actions. The dynamic dimension
enables us to discuss what we believe to be a surprising and debatable consequence of the
Greatest Fixpoint Axiom GFP(CKJ) of Table 8.
9.1 Public announcement logic with common knowledge PALCK
Public Announcement Logic with Common Knowledge PALCK is an extension of the logic
of common knowledge by public announcements. It may as well be viewed as an extension
of PAL by common knowledge. An axiomatisation of PALCK can be found in [14, Fig. 9]. It
extends the axiomatics of PAL of Table 7 by the following rule:
χ → 〈ϕ!〉ψ (χ ∧ ϕ) → EKIψ
χ → 〈ϕ!〉CKIψ
The common knowledge version 〈ψ !〉CKJϕ ↔ ψ∧CKJ [ψ !]ϕ of the reduction axiom
Red(Ki) cannot be proved in PALCK: while the right-to-left direction is a theorem, the
left-to-right direction is not. So common knowledge may ‘pop up’ as a consequence of a
public announcement in a way that is unforeseeable for the group J . In contrast, the reduc-
tion axiomRed(Ki) says that an agent can foresee what he will know after the announcement
of ψ , namely what he currently knows to be true after the announcement of ψ . From a more
general perspective, this means that the logical properties of the common knowledge operator
differ from that of the individual knowledge operator, while these two operators obey exactly
the same principles in the underlying epistemic logic: when the principles for Ki are those
of S5 then the principles for CKJ are those of S5, too. Beyond such formal considerations,
the sequel provides an example casting some doubt on the suitability of PALCK as a logic of
common knowledge and public announcements.
9.2 The ignorant compatriots example
We take over an example from [77]. Suppose agents B and C are both Italian, expressed by
the conjunction itB∧itC , and don’t know each other. They accidentally meet in the coffee
break of some conference and start to talk in English. It is commonsense knowledge—and
by that also common knowledge of A and B—that each of them knows whether he/she is
Italian or not. This is described by the following formula:
Init = itB ∧ itC ∧
∧
i∈{B,C}
CK{B,C}
(
(iti→Ki iti ) ∧ (¬iti→Ki¬iti )
)
.
However, B does not know that C is Italian and C does not know that B is Italian.
We consider two continuations of our story.
In the first scenario, a third agent who happens to know both of them overhears their
conversation and truthfully declares: “Hey, you are both Italian!” By the announcement it
clearly becomes common knowledge that both are Italian: we have
⊢PALCK Init →
〈
itB∧itC !
〉
CK{B,C}
(
itB∧itC
)
.
In the second scenario, the third agent truthfully says: “Hey, you are compatriots!” Surpris-
ingly, the principles ofPALCK tell us that itB∧itC immediately becomes common knowledge,
too:
⊢PALCK Init →
〈
itB↔itC !
〉
CK{B,C}(itB∧itC ).
To see this, remember from Sect. 8 that itB↔itC being boolean, we have
⊢PALCK
[
itB↔itC !
]
CK{B,C}(itB↔itC ),
and that we have moreover
⊢ELCK CK{B,C}
((
itB↔itC
)
∧
∧
i∈{B,C}
(
iti→Ki iti
))
→ CK{B,C}
((
itB∧itC
)
→ EKB,C
(
itB∧itC
))
.
Together with the instance
⊢PALCK
((
itB∧itC
)
∧ CK{B,C}
((
itB∧itC
)
→ EK{B,C}(itB∧itC )
))
→ CK{B,C}
(
itB∧itC
)
of the Greatest Fixpoint Axiom GFP(CKJ) it follows that
⊢PALCK Init → CK{B,C}
(
itB∧itC
)
.
This inference is however at least questionable: in real life conversations, agent B is able
to infer from his knowledge that CKJ
(
itC→KC itC
)
and the truthful public announcement
itB↔itC ! that itB , KC itB , KCKB itB , KCKBKC itB , etc. are all true, up to any level of nesting;
however, it seems that the announcement of itB↔itC nevermakes itB∧itC part of the common
ground of the conversation.5 One may argue that human agents may fail to infer all logical
consequences in such a situation, just as they fail to infer the right conclusion in the case
of other logical fallacies. However, we find it puzzling that the formal model of common
knowledge does not match human reasoning in a simple situation with two agents and two
propositions at stake.
It was proposed in [77] that one should distinguish two forms of common knowledge:
implicit commonknowledge and explicit commonknowledge,withmodal operatorsCKJ and
ECKJ . Implicit common knowledge is PALCK common knowledge: it has the least fixpoint
axiom and there is no reduction axiom for it. In contrast, explicit common knowledge ECKJ
does not have the least fixpoint axiom (it is some fixpoint, but not necessarily the least) and
has the following reduction axiom:
[ψ !]ECKJϕ ↔ ¬ψ ∨ ECKJ [ψ !]ϕ.
Let PALCK,ECK be the resulting logic (for some underlying normal modal logic of individual
knowledge EL). In the second scenario of our compatriots example we get the following two
theorems:
⊢PALCK,ECK Init →
〈
itB∧itC !
〉(
CK{B,C}(itB∧itC ) ∧ ECK{B,C}(itB∧itC )
)
,
⊢PALCK,ECK Init →
〈
itB↔itC !
〉(
CK{B,C}(itB∧itC ) ∧ ¬ECK{B,C}(itB∧itC )
)
.
So the two operators lead to the same outcome in the first scenario, while we obtain two dif-
ferent outcomes in the second scenario, depending on the kind of common knowledge under
consideration. It therefore seems that the modal operator ECKJ might be more appropriate
for example for reasoning about the common ground in conversation.
We contend that the above criticism is not as stringent as the others we have put forward
up to now, which had a more formal nature. However, we believe that the standard account of
common knowledge in terms of the least fixpoint axiom deserves to be questioned. Actually
5 Thanks are due to Nicholas Asher for a confirmation of that point in conversation.
the issue brought up by our second scenario can be related to the omniscience problem: it
illustrates that the inference of common knowledge that is delivered by the least fixpoint
axiom is by no means guaranteed if agents have limited reasoning capabilities. The least
fixpoint axiom has therefore to be considered as a further omniscience principle, to be added
to those that we have listed for the individual knowledge operator in Sect. 5.1. The systematic
failure of humans to infer common knowledge in our simple scenario indicates that it should
actually be the first epistemic principle to be questioned when investigating the omniscience
problem.
9.3 A remark on distributed knowledge
The extension ofPAL by distributed knowledge has not been studiedmuch,with the exception
of [50,122]. We do not discuss the issue here and refer the reader to the above papers.
This is however the rightmoment to point out the shortcoming of our informal definition of
distributed knowledge as ‘knowledge achievable by communication’. This works for boolean
formulas as well as for positive epistemic formulas: formulas without action operators and
without epistemic operators in the scope of negation. It is inappropriate for Moore sentences
such as p∧¬Ki p. To see this consider the extension ofArbitrary Public Announcement Logic
APAL of Sect. 6.3 by the shared knowledge operator and define “ϕ is distributed knowledge
in the group of all agents I” as the formula 〈!〉EKIϕ. Suppose I contains at least two agents
i and j , and suppose j knows that p∧¬Ki p. As individual knowledge implies distributed
knowledge (cf. Sect. 2.1), p∧¬Ki p must be distributed knowledge in I. However, p∧¬Ki p
cannot become knowledge of i , i.e., Ki (p∧¬Ki p) is inconsistent in S5 (it is actually already
so in the weaker logic KD4). It follows that p∧¬Ki p cannot become shared knowledge of
any group involving i and, a fortiori, not of I: the formula EKI(p∧¬Ki p) is inconsistent in
S5CK.
Similarly, in our scenario the formula p∧¬Ki p cannot become common knowledge of I.
So a more demanding definition of distributed knowledge as achievable common knowledge
leads to a problem, too. The problem actually already shows up for a less demanding scenario
where j knows that p∧¬CKI p.
This calls for further investigation of the interplay between announcements and distributed
knowledge.
10 Group knowledge, strategic actions: ATELCK
The grande finale of our presentation is the class of logics having both group knowledge
and strategic actions. We focus on the extension of the logic ATEL of Sect. 7 by common
knowledge, appropriately baptised ATELCK.
The logicATELCK inherits all the problems of its fragments: as to the epistemic dimension,
we have seen that we get in trouble if we choose S5 as the logic of knowledge and should
choose S4.2 instead (cf. Sect. 5.2), which in turn leads to technical problems (cf. Sect.
6.2) and we have seen that the Greatest Fixpoint Axiom GFP(CKJ) might be too strong for
common knowledge (cf. Sect. 9.2); as to the dynamic dimension, we have seen that ATL
strategies lack commitments (cf. Sect. 4.2) and that ATEL does not enable us to reason about
uniform choices and uniform strategies (cf. Sect. 7).
We do not want to discuss these problems again here. Instead, we briefly mention a further
difficulty: when we want to say that a group J knows how to achieve some goal ϕ, i.e., that J
knows that J has a strategy to achieve ϕ, then it is not clear which kind of group knowledge is
required. Sometimes distributed knowledgeDKJ 〈[J ]〉Fϕ is enough; sometimes shared knowl-
edge EKJ 〈[J ]〉Fϕ is enough; and sometimes common knowledge CKJ 〈[J ]〉Fϕ is required.
For example, the Byzantine agreement problem where communication is asynchronous and
where messages may get lost requires common knowledge of a uniform strategy. In contrast,
when public announcements can be made then distributed knowledge is enough. We believe
that this is an interesting topic for further investigation.
11 Summary and research challenges
We have categorised logics for MAS in terms of the knowledge dimension and the action
dimension, and for each category we have revisited and criticised its most prominent logics.
As to logics with nonstrategic action operators, we have advocated DL-PA as an interesting
logic that solves the frame problem and that embeds logics of nonstrategic ability. We believe
it to be an appropriate basis for formal approaches to knowledge representation in general
and toMAS in particular. Beyond the embedding of CL-PC that we have recalled in Sect. 3.5,
the central role of DL-PA is confirmed by DL-PA accounts of update and revision operations
[54], belief merging operations [63], abstract argumentation theories and their modification
[33], and answer-set programs and their modification [36]; moreover, its epistemic extension,
public announcement logic with assignments, solves the epistemic frame problem [114,115].
As to logics with epistemic operators, we have recalled that S5 is inadequate as a logic of
knowledge and should be replaced by S4.2; furthermore, we have shown that the definition
of common knowledge by means of the Greatest Fixpoint Axiom GFP(CKJ) is at least
questionable. Finally, as to logics with strategic action operators, we have shown that ATL
has to be augmented by some notion of commitment (to an action or to a strategy) and that
just as arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL), its epistemic extension is too weak to
cover reasoning about uniform strategies.
Let us terminate by sketching and discussing some challenges for future research.
11.1 From logics of knowledge to logics of belief (including belief revision)
In Sect. 5.2 we have criticised the choice of S5 as the logic of knowledge. One may however
hope that negative introspection is justifiable at least in some contexts. For example, the
interpreted systems from which knowledge is defined in [35] naturally validate that axiom.
It would be interesting to investigate under which circumstances the axiom is a reasonable
assumption. As far as we know this has not been investigated up to now.
The epistemic concepts of individual knowledge and group knowledge have doxastic
counterparts, viz. the concepts of individual belief and group belief. Belief is actually more
primitive a concept than knowledge, and many have tried to define the latter from the former.
However, there is no consensus about their precise relationship apart from simple principles
such as ‘knowledge implies belief’ that we have mentioned in Sect. 6.
Themove towards beliefs comes with some new problems. The first difficulty is that while
knowledge is binary—either you know or you don’t—, belief typically comes in degrees.
How this should be modeled and how degrees relate to (subjective) probability theory is an
old and much debated subject of research. The second and main difficulty is that contrarily to
knowledge, beliefs sometimes have to be revised: while knowledge is always true (because
knowledge implies truth), an agent’s beliefs may be false. In the context ofPAL, an agent may
wrongly believe that some announcement ψ cannot be made because he wrongly believes ψ
to be false. In such circumstances only the left-to-right direction 〈ψ !〉Biϕ → (ψ ∧Bi [ψ !]ϕ)
of the (belief version of the) reduction axiom Red(Ki) of Table 7 holds, and trivially so,
while the right-to-left direction (ψ ∧Bi [ψ !]ϕ) → 〈ψ !〉Biϕ does not. A satisfactory doxastic
version of PAL clearly has to integrate some notion of belief revision. How this should be
done is still very much an open issue, despite numerous recent efforts [6,7,102,107,113]. In
our view, a further problem that has not been addressed up to now in a satisfactory manner
is that almost all belief revision theories presuppose some kind of preference information:
in many cases it is not clear at all where this information comes from. In other words, the
challenge is to find simpler, more modest theories of revision that can be easily and smoothly
integrated into logics of belief and action. First steps in that direction can be found in recent
papers, but much remains to be done [15–17].
Past artificial intelligence andMAS research on logics of knowledge and belief focussed a
lot on the omniscience problem that we have mentioned in Sect. 5.1, probably because it was
believed to be central in the implementation of BDI agents. We think the problemmight have
been overestimated a bit, while problems related to belief update and the analysis of plans
were rather neglected in the implementation of BDI agents; see [4] for a similar point of view.
Moreover, limited reasoning has often to be disregarded when we want to reason about oppo-
nents, for example when wemodel an attacker in a cryptographic protocol. Let us finally note
that limited reasoning about common knowledge was not considered up to now in the litera-
ture on the omniscience problem.Our ‘compatriots’ example againstPALCK might be viewed
as evidence that failure of application of the Greatest Fixpoint Axiom GFP(CKJ) should be
the first thing to model in a satisfactory account of the multiagent omniscience problem.
11.2 Group belief and acceptance
Beyond individual belief, the investigation of different kinds of group belief is a highly
interesting field of research. Examples are group acceptance andwe-belief [105]. Acceptance
is contextual: a lawyer accepts that his client is innocent in the context of the court, while he
may privately believe that the client is guilty. As our law court example illustrates, neither
does acceptance imply belief nor the other way round. In contrast, belief and we-belief are
both non-contextual. We-belief differs from the standard notions of shared and common
belief (whose knowledge counterparts were presented in Sects. 2.1 and 8) in that the latter
two imply individual belief of the members of the group: for shared belief, the formula
EBJϕ →
∧
i∈J Biϕ is a theorem, and for common belief CBJϕ →
∧
i∈J Biϕ is so. In
contrast and just as group acceptance, we-belief does not imply individual belief: there may
be a group belief in J that ϕ while some of the members of J don’t believe that ϕ. For
example, in the former Soviet Union there was a we-belief that the capitalist countries would
perish soon, while only very little citizens individually believed this [105].
Failure to imply individual belief makes group acceptance and group belief relevant for
the analysis of concepts such as reputation: an agent i may have a good reputation in group
J although some members of J do not adhere to the group view. This was explored in [58]
in order to provide a logical analysis of reputation. The logics of different kinds of group
belief and their interrelations were recently investigated by several authors [40,46,79]. One
of the issues that are essentially left open in these approaches is the relation between different
contexts: in the existing proposals they are unanalysed objects.
11.3 Logic of action
As its name indicates,PAL presupposes that announcements are perceived correctly and com-
pletely by all agents. We have mentioned in Sect. 6.3 that Baltag et al.’s event models provide
an elegant generalisation where the agents’ perception of the action is modelled by means
of a Kripke model whose points are possible events and where the possible events a and b
are related by the accessibility relation for agent i if and only if a and b are indistinguish-
able for i [14]. This gave rise to a flourishing research avenue that was baptised dynamic
epistemic logics. We believe that its version with assignments as designed in [117] pro-
vides a promising basis for a unified logic allowing for reasoning about non-strategic action
in MAS.
While being theoretically elegant, event models are rather intricate to handle when mod-
elling applications where there are few agents who perceive an action while most of the
agents don’t, which is a typical situation for example in cryptographic protocols. This is due
to the occurrence of event models in the language of the logic as such: the language provides
no other means to talk about actions. This is at odds with the idea of syntactic knowledge
representation that we have followed in our presentations. It is also not clear how an appro-
priate language not incorporating such a semantical devices can be designed. First steps are
in [8,116] which propose syntactical constructions that are interpreted in event models. The
recent paper byHales et al. [47] establishes that such a language can be built fromGerbrandy’s
logic of private announcements [42] together with the PDL program operators.
We have mentioned in Sect. 4.2 that there is currently a lot of activity around strategic
reasoning, with a dedicated workshop series that started in 2013. A major challenge is to
tame complexity. Beyond extensions and fragments of strategy logic, a further interesting
research avenue is to provide such results for stit logics that were mentioned in Sect. 7 as a
framework for reasoning about uniform strategies. Some decidability results are in [99].
11.4 Logic of goals (including group goals)
In the introduction we have mentioned three fundamental concepts in MAS: knowledge,
actions and goals. However, in the present paper we did not talk at all about logics of goals,
nor about logics for the closely related concept of intention. One of the reasons for that is
that there is far less consensus here than about logics of knowledge and action. It is a major
challenge to provide logics improving that state of affairs. Just as in the case of group beliefs,
one of the most important issues is to logically analyse the relation between group goals
and individual goals. More generally, what remains to be done is an integration of so-called
belief-desire-intention (BDI) logics [31,32] with strategic logics such as ATL. First steps are
in [123].
11.5 The relation with game theory
Game theory is seen by many as the most prominent theory of interaction between rational
agents. Some of the logics that we have presented have strong links with game theory: ATL,
CL and STIT have semantic structures that were taken over from game theory. A challenge
for future research is to integrate into these logics the notion of utility. First steps in this
direction were undertaken recently by several researchers, typically encoding utilities by
means of special propositional variables [26,76,78,107]. Amore principled approach should
involve an analysis of the notion of goal, which brings us back to the preceding challenge.
We note that there is also a sort ofmismatch that remains to be investigated:whileBratman,
Cohen & Levesque and others have forcefully argued that logics of belief and goal should be
augmented by the concept of future-oriented intention—leading to BDI logics [31,32])—,
game theory in its current state does not include such a concept. It therefore remains to be
investigated whether the concept of intention could enrich game theory or not.
11.6 A general technical problem
Let us terminate on a more general note. As is always the case when modelling real-world
problems, there is a delicate balance between conceptual richness andmathematical complex-
ity. Each of the logics of knowledge and action that we have presented is amulti-dimensional
modal logic: a product logic or a semi-product [39]. Such logics are often undecidable, and
when they are decidable then they are in general very complex. This is not a problem as long
as one only wants to model some application. However, as soon as one aims at the mechan-
ical verification of MAS specifications then decidability and complexity become relevant.
We believe that one should then start from a very simple logic of action and a very simple
logic of knowledge. In this paper we have advocated DL-PA as a simple yet powerful logic
of action. Perhaps models of knowledge where knowledge is based on an underlying relation
of ‘propositional perception’ where an agent only sees the truth value of some propositional
variables [111] is a good starting point for a simple logic of knowledge.
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